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1 INTRODUCTION: IMPACT OF BANK REGULATION ON STABILITY 1
Abstract
I investigate the effect of the Basel accords’ pillars on bank stability. The
aggregation of the answers in the World Bank dataset on bank regulation
provided by Barth et al. (2013b) is shown to be valid only under strict as-
sumptions. A cross-section model provides evidence that a more powerful
supervision decreases stability in corrupt countries. The PCSE approach
in Boudriga et al. (2009) is shown to be debatable. I apply GMM estima-
tors to tackle persistence and endogeneity modeling nonperforming loans.
Keywords: financial stability, banking regulation, Basel Accords, Cron-
bach’s alpha
1 Introduction: Impact of bank regulation on stabil-
ity
Efficiency and stability of the financial sector affect the economy. The insti-
tutional environment of a country limits banks’ opportunities and thus affects
banking sector performance, the economy, and welfare. Banks support the
growth of the economy by allocating money to where it is needed most. Or,
bank managers and corrupt officials use their influence to support a small priv-
ileged group. These two alternative views1 apply to the regulation as well.
Regulators – influenced by politically powerful groups – can work in the public
interest and foster a well functioning system or in a private interest for the gain
of a few.2
The Basel capital accords first passed in 1988 provide a best practice approach
to bank regulation which is adopted by practically all countries. Basel II in-
troduced the three pillars approach based on minimum capital requirements,
supervisory review, and market discipline.3,4 The concern about the Basel ac-
cords is that the approach mainly developed by rich countries5 does not fit all
countries. In fact, under high corruption it can be counterproductive to give
the supervisory authorities more rights6 as the power might be used to extract
further private rents.7
1Stigler, 1971, p. 3
2Compare Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006, chap. 2) for the public and private interest view
of regulation.
3Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004, paragraph 4
4Basel III concentrates on the first pillar, i.e. capital requirements (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2010, paragraph 1).
5An indication is the share of European countries, 10 out of 27, being member of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010, foot-
note 1) where the share of geographical Europe at the world population is well below 10%.
6Compare principle 2 and 3 about the scope of supervisory action under “Four key principles
of supervisory review” in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 725ff).
7Barth et al., 2006, p. 3
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The policy question behind my analysis is how countries should implement the
Basel accords to reform for the better. Based on the most extensive dataset on
worldwide bank regulation, the Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys of
the World Bank, Barth et al. (2006) conducted “the first, comprehensive, cross-
country assessment of the impact of bank regulatory and supervisory practices”8
on banking sector outcomes. For 1999 and 2002 they regress proxies for bank
efficiency, bank development, and bank fragility on indices representing the
three Basel pillars and conclude (a) that strengthening supervisory review is not
advisable as a general rule, and (b) that market discipline should be emphasized
more.9
In the following analysis I concentrate on the regulatory effect of the three
Basel pillars; and I restrict myself to evaluate their impact on bank stability.10
To investigate the impact of regulation in different institutional environments
I separate the country sample along corruption and income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The Bank Regulation and Super-
vision Survey is discussed in section 2. A cross-section analysis is conducted in
section 3 which uses the paper Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012) as a starting
point. It is shown that in contrast to the original the dependent should be
modeled in logs and the results cast doubt on the Barth et al. (2006) findings
concerning the distinct positive effect of private monitoring. Section 4 incor-
porates the time dimension. Related to Boudriga, Taktak, and Jellouli (2009)
evidence is gained that due to serial correlation in the error terms the authors’
results are questionable. Nonperforming loans appear to follow an autocorrel-
ative pattern which I set out to model using dynamic linear panel estimators.
2 Analysis of the Bank Regulation and Supervision
Survey
In this section the data is introduced. It is explained why the raw material needs
to be aggregated into indices (2.1), how Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013b) cope
with nonavailable items and an evaluation of the indices’ validity is given (2.2).
The section concludes with descriptive statistics (2.3).
8Barth et al., 2006, p. 3
9Barth et al., 2006, p. 316
10I will use the term regulation as a generic description for bank regulation and for bank
supervision reviewing the compliance with the rules.
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2.1 The data set
In the time frame 1999 through 2011 the World Bank conducted four Bank Reg-
ulation and Supervision Surveys, covering about 180 countries. The questions
were given to bank regulatory officials and are supposed to represent the formal
regulatory situation. The data does not represent how regulation and supervi-
sion is actually carried out. This information would be useful to determine the
regulatory effect on bank fragility. In this sense the data is second best for the
research question of this paper, but nevertheless the best data available.
The questionnaire was given to several officials to cross-check the answers and
gaps were filled when information could be attained from other official sources.11
Due to the lengthy process the surveys do not represent a specific moment, but
a time period. Table 1 summarizes meta data on the surveys.
Table 1: Bank Regulation and Supervision survey overview
Survey Conducted1 Representing2 Published3 Nr. of Countries
I 1999 1999 2001 119-170
II 2003 End 2002 2003 144-168
III 2007 2005-06 2007 128-173
IV 2011 2011-12 2013 116-143
The number of countries covered is given as complete cases (lower bound) and cases
where at least one answer was given (upper bound) based on the “All Average Scaled
Index” considering the variables used in Barth et al. (2012). 1Barth et al., 2013b, 2Barth
et al., 2012, p. 2, 3The World Bank, 2013b.
The World Bank posts the raw survey data of which about 60% are binary
questions that are to be answered by “Yes” or “No”, about 35% ask for numeri-
cal indicators like the share of government-owned banks, and the rest demands
to choose between a set of alternatives.12 The main survey authors Barth et
al. use the survey raw data and improve on each of the four surveys resolving
inconsistencies and filling gaps. What is more, they aggregate the data to make
it directly usable in research.13 The aggregation is important because single bi-
nary questions which capture a sub-aspect of e.g. capital regulatory stringency
would not be useful as such to explain financial sector differences like bank
fragility.14 Based on their aggregation they conduct own research, e.g. Barth
11Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2013a, p. 1f
12The World Bank, 2013b
13Barth et al., 2013a, p. 3ff
14To investigate the effect of the three Basel pillars on bank stability one might use many
of the binary variables. Following Barth et al. (2013b) this would be 36 variables for the
pillars (compare table 2 below). Both the interpretation and the degrees of freedom in the
estimation would be a concern.
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et al. (2012) as well as other authors like Boudriga et al. (2009). I attempt to
reproduce both papers later on.
2.2 Are indices reliable and represent a common factor?
Investigating the impact of regulation on bank fragility relies on reasonably con-
structed indices. Therefore, the index construction should be reviewed. Barth
et al. clearly refer to obstacles and limitations in building proper indices, re-
ferring to the process as “[t]he Art and Science of Forming Indices”.15 Even so
the authors do not explain and justify their choices. Importantly, the decision
which questions enter an index is based solely on theory and the authors’ judg-
ment. There is no confirmation based on what the data has to say.16 Rather,
the authors state that the grouping and weighting is not unique and encourage
researchers to build their own indices.17
Methods to build indices At the core of their approach is to take the sum
over the questions entering an index. Mostly the questions are asked such that
the answer “Yes” stands for more regulatory stringency and is coded with a 1.
One important aspect is how to cope with missing information. Barth et al.
provide two different approaches. There is an “All Index” which gives an index
value only when the answers to all underlying questions are provided and an
“All Average Scaled Index” which allows for missing values. The second index
is calculated as the mean of the available items18 where the index value is only
given when at least 50% of the underlying questions were answered and more
than two questions enter. Based on this methodology and concentrating on the
variables used in re-estimating Barth et al. (2012) there are, varying by survey,
119 to 144 complete cases (shown in table 1). For the “All Index” there are
only 47 to 87 complete answers. Setting a threshold for the least available item
share is reasonable because uncertainty is associated with this procedure. In
the extreme, one answer would decide over the index value summarizing many
questions. However, the threshold value of 50% might not be optimal and is,
again, not discussed by the authors.
Concentration on variables of interest In the rest of the analysis I con-
centrate on the bank regulatory variables used in the reproduction of Barth et
al. (2012) and Boudriga et al. (2009) in section 3 and 4. Table 2 provides the
15Barth et al., 2013a, p. 10
16At least I don’t see a statistical approach mentioned in Barth et al. (2006), Barth et al.
(2013a), or the other publications of these authors mentioned in the references.
17Barth et al., 2006, p. 80f
18The value is then multiplied by the number of questions entering the index such that both
indexation methods yield the same measurement scale.
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index definitions and paraphrases the questions the indices consist of. The first
three indices represent the Basel pillars capital regulation, official supervision
and market discipline. These general aspects of a jurisdiction are represented
by ten or more questions. The Capital Regulatory Index tries to capture how
limited banks are in using sources as regulatory capital. The first question for
this index is in all surveys whether the Basel I capital adequacy regime is used
and the answer “Yes” is considered as adding to stringency.19 For 1999 – where
Basel I still had to be refered to as “Basle guidelines”20 – this assignment ap-
pears fair. However, in 2011 Basel I was rather out-dated than strict. This
exemplifies the difficulty to balance between continuity over time to increase
comparability and adequacy of the questions.
Unidimensionality and reliability The indices presented give a single value
summarizing the underlying questions. In the special case of a one-variable in-
dex no information is removed (lower part of table 2). When different questions
are represented by one value the statistic is misleading except for the case where
the questions stand for the same underlying concept. We thus require a common
factor behind the questions, or unidimensionality.
Imagine a country’s overall stringency in permitted bank activities is to be as-
sessed. Therefore restrictions in bank insurance and real estate activities are
measured. If high restrictions in one activity are associated with high restric-
tions in the other we do not reject unidimensionality. If, however, either bank
insurance activities or real estate activities are allowed the index is not uni-
dimensional. Then the index value as a summary statistic is not informative
about the underlying diverging patterns which might influence bank fragility
differently. Statistically, a necessary condition for unidimensionality is a pos-
itive correlation of the items entering an index. Table 3 gives for all indices
used the number of items which exhibit a negative correlation. Notably, there
is not a single index which is free of negative correlation between the items.
Rather, in many cases a considerable share of items shows a negative associa-
tion from which I conclude that the indices – or “scales” – offered by Barth et
al. are of questionable validity. Using them for analysis introduces a consider-
able momentum of uncertainty about measuring what we expect to measure.
The main hope is that the overall index value is based on a good theory-driven
item selection under which the indices are still informative. E.g. when bank
insurance activity restrictions are high while real estate restrictions are not we
19Barth et al., 2013b, Sheet “Index Overview”, No. IV.I
20Barth et al., 2013b, Sheet “Index Overview”, question 3.1.1
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Table 2: Bank Regulation and Supervision survey variable definitions
Index (range) Definition Questions
Capital Reg-
ulatory Index
(0-10)
Whether capital re-
quirements reflect risk,
market value losses re-
duce capital adequacy
and to which scope
sources are accepted
to initially capitalize a
bank.
Is Basel I used? What fraction of revaluation
gains is allowed as part of capital? Are unreal-
ized losses in fair valued exposures deducted from
regulatory capital? Are sources of funds verified
by authorities? Can the initial disbursement or
subsequent injections of capital be done with as-
sets other than cash or government securities (Yes
= 0)?
Private Mon-
itoring Index
(0-12)
Measures the incen-
tives and the ability
for the private moni-
toring of firms.
Do banks disclose off-balance sheet items to
the public? Are bank regulators/supervisors re-
quired to make public formal enforcement ac-
tions, which include cease and desist orders
and written agreements between a bank regula-
tory/supervisory body and a banking organiza-
tion? To what extent counts subordinated debt
as part of Tier 1/Tier 2 capital?
Official Su-
pervisory
Power (0-14)
Whether the supervi-
sory authorities have
the authority to take
specific actions to pre-
vent and correct prob-
lems.
Do banks disclose off-balance sheet items to su-
pervisors? Can the supervisory agency force
banks (a) “to constitute provisions to cover ac-
tual or potential losses”? (b) “to reduce or sus-
pend dividends to shareholders”? (c) “to reduce
or suspend bonuses and other remuneration to
bank directors and managers”? Can the super-
visory agency force banks to change its internal
organizational structure?
Entry into
Banking Re-
quirements
(0-8)
Whether various types
of legal submissions
are required to obtain
a banking license.
What is legally required before a banking license
can be obtained? Draft bylaws, market/business
strategy, financial projections, experience of fu-
ture Board directors, source of funds to be used
as capital.
Overall Re-
strictions
on Banking
Activities
(3-12)
The extent to which
banks may engage
in securities, insur-
ance and real estate
activities.
For the three activity categories a ranking de-
manded: Can banks directly and fully engage in
activities (stringency = 1) up to activities are not
allowed in either banks or subsidiaries (stringency
= 4).
Variable range Definition
Government-
Owned Banks
0%-100% Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks
that are 50% or more government owned.
Foreign-
Owned Banks
0%-100% The extent to which the banking system’s assets
are foreign owned.
Bank Con-
centration
(Assets)
0%-100% The degree of concentration of assets in the 5
largest banks.
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey indices used in Barth et al. (2012) and Boudriga
et al. (2009) are shown. Higher values stand for higher stringency. The indices are grouped
into those consisting of multiple questions (upper part) and those out of one variable (lower
part). The questions are paraphrased based on surveys I-IV and not exhaustive. Range,
definitions, and questions are taken from Barth et al. (2013b) and Barth et al. (2013a, Table
5).
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have to assume that in a country with the opposite pattern yielding the same
index value the effect on bank fragility is the same to a large extent.
Table 3: Unidimensionality and reliability of the indices
Index (items) Survey cor< 0 (cor) MIC Pα α Countries
Overall Capital
Stringency (7)
I 7 (21) 0.12 0.06 0.48 65
II 10 (21) 0.08 0.06 0.38 73
III 4 (15) 0.21 0.07 0.65 69
IV 3 (6) 0.02 0.05 0.13 84
Private Monitor-
ing Index (12)
I 17 (36) 0.03 0.12 0.07 19
II 17 (36) 0.04 0.09 0.10 68
III 12 (36) 0.05 0.09 0.12 73
IV 15 (28) 0.00 0.13 -0.01 90
Official Supervi-
sory Power (34)
I 28 (91) 0.12 0.01 0.82 104
II 61 (276) 0.12 0.01 0.82 109
III 68 (253) 0.08 0.01 0.74 119
IV 24 (66) 0.08 0.01 0.75 121
Entry into Bank-
ing Requirements
(8)
I 7 (28) 0.16 0.03 0.60 155
II 0 (28) 0.26 0.02 0.74 159
III 7 (28) 0.23 0.04 0.70 169
IV 12 (15) 0.02 0.02 0.14 140
Overall Restric-
tions on Banking
Activities (3)
I 0 (3) 0.31 0.10 0.57 126
II 0 (3) 0.25 0.08 0.50 151
III 1 (3) 0.10 0.13 0.24 138
IV 0 (3) 0.25 0.08 0.50 132
Government-Owned Banks (1) A single question.
Foreign-Owned Banks (1) A single question.
Bank Concentration, Assets (1) A single question.
Measures of internal consistency and unidimensionality per index and survey. All avail-
able items are used to calculate the statistics.
cor< 0 (cor) – number of negative item-correlations and in brackets the number of item-
correlations in a triangle of the correlation matrix, MIC – mean interitem correlation,
Pα – precision of alpha, α – Cronbach’s α, Countries – Number of countries for which
all index items were answered in that survey. For the remaining variation in number of
correlations compare the note concerning incalculable correlations on page 9.
In the rest of this subsection I exploit finer statistical tools for index appropri-
ateness accompanied by the warning that their validity decreases with a higher
share of negatively correlated items. The mean interitem correlation (MIC)
tries to capture the extent to which items measure the same.21 To get the MIC
one can calculate the mean of all entries in the lower triangle of a correlation
21Bühner, 2004, p. 123
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matrix for the variables entering an index.22 I expect the indices to repre-
sent a metric latent variable behind the underlying questions. Thus, I use the
Bravais-Pearson correlation to calculate the MIC.23 A correlation of .5 might be
interpreted as no clear relation. Therefore a MIC of .5 might serve as a crude
tool to assess unidimensionality.
The dispersion of correlations is valuable information not considered in the
MIC. A small dispersion of the correlations supports the conclusion of a unidi-
mensional index. The precision of α,
Pα =
σMIC√
(1/2 ∗N ∗ (N − 1))− 1
is a measure for this, where N is the number of items which enter an index and
σMIC is the standard deviation of the item intercorrelations.24 Pα increases
with intercorrelation dispersion and might thus be called “imprecision of α”.
As a rule of thumb, Bühner (2004, p. 123) proposes a threshold of Pα < 0.01
as supportive for unidimensionality. Table 3 gives both statistics for the used
indices.25 The MIC are all below .5 and Pα is often above 0.01 which indicates
a severe problem with multidimensionality in all five indices in the upper part
of table 3.
Cronbach’s α is often used in the context of evaluating indices. Related to the
MIC it can be written as (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 44)
α = N ∗MIC1 + (N − 1) ∗MIC .
Essentially the MIC is corrected by the number of itemsN . It can be interpreted
as an upper bound for the unidimensionality of the data.26 However, it is
unclear how far off the true value the measure is.27 I present Cronbach’s α
in table 3. When following Cortina (1993, p. 102) a value of 0.75 should be
exceeded to be “acceptable” regardless of N . Overall, a low value is a sign that
there is a problem – and most of the values are below 0.75. A high value, on
22Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 44f
23Calculating the MIC based on Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient does not significantly
change the picture. One reason for this is that for 0/1-coded variables the Pearson and
Spearman correlation are identical.
24Cortina, 1993, p. 100
25The values are calculated based on all available information. The reliability can increase
when the share of non-available items in an index is limited. I discuss below that the allowed
NA share has a negligible influence on Cronbach’s α.
26Cronbach, 1951, p. 320f
27Cortina (1993, p. 101) alludes to the assumption of “tau-equivalence” of Cronbach’s α which
can be problematic, Bühner (2004, p. 122f) describes how the measure can be biased from
adding items which are not useful and that Cronbach’s α can be outside the range 0 to 1.
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the other hand, does not show the absence of a problem and thus Cronbach’s
α is to be used with caution.28
A necessary condition for an index to be useful is its reliability. According to
Bühner (2004, p. 121f) Cronbach’s α gives a lower bound for an index’ relia-
bility. Thus, a high α gives unambigous information about high reliability but
an unclear statement about unidimensionality. When the index items are split
in halves, more correlation between the parts is a sign for higher reliability.
Cronbach’s α is numerically identical to the mean of all possible split-half cor-
relations.29,30 Based on α, the official supervisory power index has the highest
reliability which is rather stable over the surveys. For some indices reliabil-
ity appears clearly nonsatisfying. Even under the assumption that the indices
are useful without being unidimensional low reliability is an important concern
about the presented analysis based on Barth et al. (2013b).
Some of the correlations for table 3 were incalculable. E.g. for overall capital
stringency and survey III the question “Is the minimum capital-asset ratio re-
quirement risk weighted in line with the 1988 Basle guidelines?”31 is answered
with “No” only by Nigeria and Venezuela. However, both countries gave no
answer in a second question for the index. Computing the correlation for this
pair is not possible because the standard deviation in the first question is zero.
In such cases I dropped the variables lacking relevant variation to calculate the
measures in table 3.
Varying the share of NA items I noted above that Barth et al. (2013b)
use a threshold of 50% as the smallest share of available items allowed when
constructing their “All Average Scaled Index”. The threshold is not discussed
by the authors. I vary this threshold by 10% steps and control for the change in
Cronbach’s α. For official supervisory power the largest difference is obtained
for survey IV. Allowing a share of non-available (NA) items of at most 0% (“All
Index”), 10%, and 20% yields a Cronbach’s α of 0.71, 0.73, and .75, respectively.
28Another approach to test unidimensionality is factor analysis. Conducting an exploratory
factor analysis using principal components based on correlations, the Kaiser criterion pro-
poses for official supervisory power in all surveys at least 5 factors. This is evidence against
the appropriateness of assuming one underlying latent variable (a factor). Following the ob-
jection that the Kaiser criterion might find too many relevant factors I use Horn’s parallel
analysis in which still at least 3 factors are proposed (Bortz & Schuster, 2010, p. 415f).
29Cronbach, 1951, p. 302ff
30Our measures are collected at one point in time and jugded once. When e.g. repeated
measurements are available one might measure test-retest reliability. Here we are limited in
our choice and test reliability as internal consistency (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003,
p. 129f).
31“(...) with the 1988 Basle guidelines?” is taken from Barth et al. (2013b, Index Overview,
question 3.1.1). However, in the Excel file it remains unclear which risk ratio is related to.
This information is taken from the list of guide question in Barth et al. (2006, p. 337).
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Increasing the allowed NA share further leaves the α unchanged. Notably, there
is no clear pattern over the different indices and surveys that a higher or lower
NA share allowed is associated with a higher α. Additionally, the variation in α
appears negligible. In conclusion, a threshold of at last 50% NA items appears
to be a reasonable compromise between using the collected information and
treating a small amount of answers as representative for a hole index. In this
regard my statistical analysis supports the indexation by Barth et al. (2013b).
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 gives an impression of the Barth et al. (2013b) dataset coverage. Coun-
tries marked in black are contained in the most recent surveys III and IV while
those in grey are only contained in survey III.32 The impression is gained that
many African countries left the survey. Though, recognizing that the grey
coloured block of central African countries is identical to the members of a fi-
nancial union33 it appears likely that the block left due to a common decision. I
conclude that there is no particular geographical concentration of the countries
leaving the survey. Thus there is some evidence to assume random missingness
in the sampled countries which is important for the statistical analysis.
in survey III and IV
in survey survey III but not in IV
Figure 1: Coverage of survey III and IV on a world map
Comprehensive coverage of survey III, some fewer countries in survey IV.
32Coverage is measured based on countries giving at least one answer in the “All Average
Scaled Index”. Survey III contains the highest number of countries. From survey III to
survey IV Ecuador, Gambia, Iraq, Turkey, and Yemen were added.
33The grey block represents the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(CAEMC) consisting of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, and Gabon (Barth et al., 2013b, “Groups with uniform bank regulations and su-
pervisory practices”).
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Accepting a random country coverage, I am interested in the answer pattern of
the sampled countries. One dimension is whether the missingness by question
appears to be random; the share of countries for which the indices are avail-
able ranges between 66-91% with a standard deviation of about about 10%. I
consider the dispersion as not too large. To obtain these values I look at all
four surveys, use the “All Average Scaled Index” version, and restrict on the
indices used to reproduce Barth et al. (2012) and Boudriga et al. (2009). For
the “All Index” – where a missing value in a items leads to a NA for the index
– only 47-87% are available with a slightly greater dispersion. Based on these
numbers and the findings varying the allowed NA share I use the “All Average
Scaled Index” throughout the subsequent analysis.
Another dimension is whether the missingness related to answers per country
appears to be random. Figure 2 shows that 35 countries gave answers such that
1-4 index values can be calculated in 1999 (survey I). However, zero countries
answered in such a way in 2011 (survey IV). Questions added to survey IV
due to the financial crisis might have triggered either survey fatigue or the
motivation to answer many questions. In this indirect way the change in other
survey questions might affect the indices used in the analysis which are build
on as tantamount questions as possible to allow comparability over the horizon
of over 10 years. Survey IV stands out again as the study answered by the least
countries. These issues might flaw the identification of patterns; I assume that
this is not the case.
The standard deviations of the three indices representing the Basel pillars are
nearly unchanged comparing 1999 and 2011. The mean stringency of capital
regulation clearly and of private monitoring marginally increased while mean
supervisory power marginally decreased. Underlying the values is a considerable
dispersion. Capital stringency (index range is 0-10) was decreased over the 12
years by United Kingdom, Austria, and Mexico by 5 while Venezuela, Turkey,
and Bangladesh increased it by 6. In Kazakhstan official supervisory power
(index range is 0-14) was decreased by about 8 while Italy increased it by 7.
Private monitoring (index range is 0-12) was decreased by 2 in Portugal but
increased by 4 in India and France.34
34The information is obtained from Barth et al., 2013a, figures 9-11. In the paper much more
descriptive statistics about the studies are available. Germany increased capital regulations
by 2, both official supervisory power and private monitoring by 1, and entry into banking
requirements by 4 (only Chile and Finland increased the stringency more).
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Figure 2: Number of answers in Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey I-IV
Nine of the indices provided by Barth et al. (2013b) are used in the analysis of bank fragility.
The distribution of available indices by survey is shown.
3 Explaining nonperforming loans (NPL)
This section provides a cross-section analysis of the Basel pillars’ impact on
nonperforming loans (NPL). The Bank Regulation and Supervision surveys
approximately represent certain years and therefore this approach is natural.
First, I attempt to reproduce the results of Barth et al. (2012); this is shown
not to be possible due to data issues. The analysis in subsection 3.1 can be
seen as a robustness check; while significance differs somewhat the results are
in no case contradictory. Subsection 3.2 shows that the dependent should be
modeled in logs. Doing so casts doubt on the Barth et al. (2006) finding of a
distinctly positive effect of the third Basel pillar, private monitoring. Subsection
3.3 shows that the results are robust to removing outliers while 3.4 introduces
an approach to reduce endogeneity in the cross-section setting. Subsection 3.5
investigates differences along income and corruption.
3.1 Reproduction of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012)
Barth et al. (2012) investigate the determinants of NPL as a proxy for bank
fragility. Their cross-section approach for 1999 and 2011 suffers from a small
amount of observations which reduces the chance to obtain significant results.
The upside of this approach is that problems due to incorporating the time
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dimension are prevented. In their regressions Barth et al. assume that the
impact of regulation is the same in all countries,
NPLi = α+ regulation′i β + control′i γ + ui (1)
i = 1, . . . , N, for 1999, 2011, ui ∼ N(0, σ2i )
where β is a vector of dimension n1 × 1 and γ of n2 × 1 where n1 and n2 stand
for the number of regulatory variables and control variables, respectively. The
vectors regulation′i and control′i are correspondingly of dimension 1 × n1 and
1 × n2. The error is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero
and different variances, i.e. heteroscedasticity.
Definitions and sources of the variables used are shown in table 4. As regulatory
and supervisory variables the authors include the Basel accord pillars – capital
regulation, official supervision, and market discipline, the last one also called
private monitoring – as well as entry requirements and activity restrictions.
Barth et al. skip all non-complete cases: “(...) for countries with missing values,
[we] had to drop that observation (...)”.35 The regression output in Barth
et al. (2012, p. 17) shows 68 observations entering the ordinary least squares
estimation for 1999. Accordingly, at least 68 observations of the regulatory
variables without any missing values have to be available.
However, the dataset Barth et al. (2013b) contains only 44 complete cases
for the 1999 regulatory variables entering regression 1. I cannot explain this
difference; however, I observe that 109 complete cases are available for the “All
Average Scaled Index” and I assume that the authors mistook “unscaled” and
“scaled” in their description. I decide to use the richer version of the data which
gives index values even when some items are missing.36
The amount and scope of control variables in regression 1 is moderate. Barth
et al. use only the countries legal origin.37 NPL are clearly influenced by the
economic situation and therefore a time-invariant control variable like legal
35Barth et al., 2012, p. 15
36The working paper was published in December 2012. I received the 2013 dataset from the
homepage of one of the authors (Barth et al., 2013b). Data updates in the 2013 version
of the data, e.g. due to going back to the authorities and correcting entries, would have
increased the complete cases. I assume that the large discrepancies cannot be explained by
information that had to be dropped for some reason. The legal origin variables introduced
next are available for all countries of survey I and IV and cannot be the reason for the
difference.
37The source for the legal origin dummies is not stated in the working paper Barth et al.
(2012). Due to the similar approach I assume that the same source as in their earlier work
Barth et al. (2006, p. 191f) is used, namely data from La Porta et al. The co-author Shleifer
provides the data on his website (La Porta et al., 2008).
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Table 4: Variable definitions and data sources for Barth et al. (2012)
Variable Definition Original
source
Bank
nonperforming
loans to gross loans
(%), abbreviated:
NPL
Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of inter-
est and principal past due by 90 days or more)
to total gross loans (total value of loan port-
folio). The loan amount recorded as nonper-
forming includes the gross value of the loan
as recorded on the balance sheet, not just the
amount that is overdue. Note that due to dif-
ferences in national accounting, taxation, and
supervisory regimes, these data are not strictly
comparable across countries.
IMF (2008) for
2002-04, IMF
(2011) for
2005-07, IMF
(2013) for
2008-13
Capital Regulatory
Index
Whether capital requirements reflect risk, mar-
ket value losses reduce capital adequacy and
to which scope sources are accepted to initially
capitalize a bank.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Private Monitoring
Index
Measures whether there are incentives/ability
for the private monitoring of firms, with higher
values indicating more private monitoring.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Official
Supervisory Power
Whether the supervisory authorities have the
authority to take specific actions to prevent and
correct problems.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Entry into Banking
Requirements
Whether various types of legal submissions are
required to obtain a banking license.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Overall
Restrictions on
Banking Activities
The extent to which banks may engage in secu-
rities, insurance and real estate activities.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Government-
Owned
Banks
Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks
that are 50% or more government owned.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Legal origin Dummies for legal origin English, French, Ger-
man, and Scandinavian.
La Porta,
Silanes, and
Shleifer (2008)
origin appears insufficient. In this section I stick to the authors’ approach
while section 4 will use a more comprehensive set of control variables.
Capturing bank fragility with NPL Barth et al. use as dependent variable
NPL as a share of total assets. The share increases when NPL increase which
puts pressure on the banks’ equity and is thus a good indicator for bank fragility.
Nonetheless, if total assets increase and are used for speculation in less regulated
fields, NPL as a share of total assets can go down although risk and bank
fragility increase. This calls for a more confined concept. I will use NPL as
a share of total loans. Additionally, NPL as a share of total loans is publicly
3.1 REPRODUCTION OF BARTH, CAPRIO, AND LEVINE (2012) 15
available while the broader concept used by Barth et al. is not.38 NPL as a share
of total loans is provided by the International Monetary Fund and is available
for 77 and 92 countries in 1999 and 2011, respectively.39 The NPL variable thus
provides the least observations in regression 1 and limits the estimation’s scope.
The NPL data comes with a warning: “Due to differences in consolidation
methods, national accounting, taxation, and supervisory regimes, data are not
strictly comparable across countries.” (IMF, 2013). I translate this additional
uncertainty into a need for strong empirical results.
Correlations The common variation of the variables entering regression 1 are
shown in table 5. NPL to total loans and the share of government-owned banks
represent at least an interval scale of measurement. The indices summing up
the individual yes/no-questions are assumed to represent a metric concept. Ac-
cordingly, the Bravais-Pearson correlation is used. Spearman’s rank correlation
as alternative does, however, not qualitatively change the picture.
Higher values represent higher stringency. In 1999 both capital regulatory strin-
gency and private monitoring are associated with lower bank fragility measured
by NPL. In contrast, the second Basel pillar supervisory power is associated
with higher bank fragility. In 2011 the common variation between the Basel
pillars and NPL is basically lost. Thus, we expect to find a clear impact of
the regulation countries adopt and the countries’ NPL level in 1999 while we
do not expect a strong impact in 2011. In the aftermath of the financial crisis
in 2011 NPL are probably too much affected by contagion, i.e. the financial
turmoil which started in the US and spread to other countries regardless of the
regulation implemented.
The share of government-owned banks will be added to equation 1 in a second
step. In 1999 the correlation of the share of government banks with private
monitoring is −.37. This represents that countries with a higher share of gov-
ernment banks – which basically face the same default risk – provide fewer
incentives for the market monitoring of risk taking. Because more government
banks are (a) associated with more fragility and (b) associated with less private
38NPL as a share of total assets is not available from the World Bank and I was not able to
receive it elsewhere in the necessary scope of a variety of the worlds’ countries and the time
frame 1999-2011.
39The NPL as a share of total loans for 1999-2011 had to be collected from three sources.
From IMF (2008) to IMF (2011) I noted no differences in overlapping years. However,
from IMF (2011) to IMF (2013) some overlapping country series exhibit clearly different
numbers. The IMF Data Dissemination and Client Services Team answered to my inquiry
that responsibilities changed within the relevant period inducing a change in methodology
in April 2011. Whereever data overlaps I use the values from the newest source available.
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Table 5: Correlations of variables in Barth et al. (2012)
(a) For 1999 / survey I
NPL CapReg PrivMon SupPow Entry ActRes GvtBk
NPL 1
CapReg −0.23 1
PrivMon −0.29 0.13 1
SupPow 0.28 −0.04 0.19 1
Entry 0.12 0.16 −0.11 0.21 1
ActRes 0.38 0.04 −0.09 0.04 0.06 1
GvtBk 0.33 −0.06 −0.37 −0.14 −0.13 0.30 1
(b) For 2011 / survey IV
NPL CapReg PrivMon SupPow Entry ActRes GvtBk
NPL 1
CapReg 0.02 1
PrivMon 0.03 0.15 1
SupPow −0.01 0.11 0.11 1
Entry −0.03 0.07 −0.08 −0.01 1
ActRes −0.17 0.32 0.06 0.19 0.12 1
GvtBk 0.12 0.04 0.01 −0.07 0.02 0.02 1
The common variation of NPL and the three Basel pillars reduced significantly
after financial crisis starting in 2007. Higher values of the bank regulatory and
supervisory variables stand for more stringent regulation. The “All Average
Scaled Index” of Barth et al. (2013b) is used. CapReg is capital regulation,
PrivMon is private monitoring, SupPow is supervisory power, Entry are Bank
entry requirements, ActRes are overall restrictions on banking activities, GvtBk
is the share of government-owned banks.
monitoring linked to more fragility I expect the introduced variable to reduce
the significance of private monitoring.
Estimation The most relevant difference compared to Barth et al. (2012) is
the dependent NPL to total loans versus their variable NPL to total assets. In
this I see the main reason for the different number of observations entering the
regressions in table 6. Model 1 uses 62 observations while the original is based on
68.40 First, I run the regressions without heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors and investigate with White’s general test to what extent the variation in
the residual variance is a problem. The Null of the test is H0: σ2i = σ2 for all
i, i.e. homoscedasticity. The squared regression residual is explained in a linear
regression by the explanatory variables and all of its squares and cross products
plus an intercept. The underlying assumption is that the functional terms are
40Adding government banks reduces the observations in the original paper more drastically
than in my regressions. As I almost surely have the same information on the share of
government banks I think this corresponds to a different country sample selected due to the
distinct dependent variable.
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sufficient to identify any heteroscedasticity. The kind of variation in the errors
does not have to be specified.41 A downside of the test is that the multiplicity
of explanatory variables in the auxiliary regression reduces degrees of freedom
and can even render the estimation infeasible.
From 62 observations 36 degrees of freedom remain in the case of the first
regression in 1999 where I obtain a multiple R2 of 41% explaining uˆ2i . The
test statistic is χ2-distributed with nR2 ∼ χ2K(K+1)/2 where K is the number
of regressors including the intercept such that n ∗ R2 = 62 ∗ .41 = 25.42 <
χ29(9+1)/2 = 51.00 such that the Null of homoscedasticity is not rejected for the
baseline regression in 1999.42,43 Repeating the exercise for 2011, i.e. model 3
in table 6, yields a p-value < 0.001 indicating heteroskedasticity in the data.44
Table 6: OLS regressions re-estimating Barth et al. (2012)
for 1999 for 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Regulation −0.015∗∗ −0.014∗ 0.003 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Private Monitoring −0.021∗∗ −0.011 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
Official Supervisory Power 0.009∗ 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Entry Requirements 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.006
Restrictions on Activities 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ −0.006∗ −0.007∗
Government-Owned Banks 0.001 0.0004
Observations 62 56 76 69
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.264 0.036 0.045
F Statistic 4.166∗∗∗ 3.191∗∗∗ 1.348 1.353
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable: nonperforming loans to gross loans. Legal origin variables and the
constant are suppressed.
Heteroscedasticity might not be present in all regressions in the reproduction
of Barth et al. (2012). Still, the application of heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors has a minor impact on the inference of a regression without
heteroscedasticity. Hence, I follow the original to use a heteroscedasticity con-
sistent (HC) covariance matrix estimation for all regressions. Barth et al. do
41Greene, 2008, p. 165f
42White, 1980, p. 824f, and Wang, 2014
43The probability for the Null (p-value) is 90.1%.
44The example in Greene (2008, p. 167) indicates that White’s test might be quite conservative.
For 1999 homoscedasticity might not be rejected even so it is present. However, applying
the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey LM test using Koenker’s version not sensitive to violations of
normality – as proposed in Greene, 2008, p. 166 – yields the same test decisions for the two
equations.
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not state which of the HC estimators they use. HC3 is a variant which builds on
White (1980) and tries to additionally correct for a bias due to small samples.
Following the Monte Carlo simulations in Long and Ervin (2000) indicating
HC3 to be the best of the alternatives I use HC3 in the cross-section analysis.
The regressions in table 6 confirm the findings from the correlations and the
general pattern fits the Barth et al. (2012) results. In 1999 capital regulatory
stringency on average significantly decreases bank fragility. More private moni-
toring has a similar stabilizing effect but the result is less robust as it is lost when
controlling for government banks. Theory tells us that the impact of official su-
pervisory power is moderated by the rule of law and corruption in a country.
The only marginal and not robust effect in 1999 is therefore not surprising.45
In 2011 (model 3 and 4) the overall F-test cannot reject H0 : β = γ = 0 (com-
pare equation 1) at a level of uncertainty of 10%. This is evidence that after
the financial crisis starting in 2007 bank fragility is driven to a large extent by
contagion and less by countries’ regulatory decisions.
Beyond a statistical significance we are interested in the effective size of an
effect. Observing in model 1 of table 6 a numerically more extreme value for
private monitoring than for capital regulation, in absolute terms, cannot be
directly evaluated in terms of effect size. The reason lies in the different mea-
surement scales used, e.g. different ranges for the Basel pillars (compare table
2). Among the Basel pillars I expect capital regulation to have the strongest
impact on NPL as its coefficient is higher than those of the other Basel pillars
which have about the same range. Using standardized regression coefficients
confirms the assessment.46
3.2 Can we trust the estimation results?
Multicollinearity is present if one of the explanatory variables can mostly be
replaced by information in the other regressors. This can have serious conse-
45The impact of activity restrictions on fragility is not clear in theory (Barth et al., 2006) and
here found to be positive while not significant in Barth et al. (2012). I don’t consider this
further as the research question is the impact of the Basel pillars.
46Standardized regression coefficients are based on the estimated coefficient and “standardize”
by multiplying with sdi/sdNPL, i.e. the standard deviation of the evaluated variable divided
by the standard deviation of the dependent (Bring, 1994, p. 210). Bring, 1994, p. 211
criticizes that using both standard deviations and coefficients is inconsistent as coefficient
estimates assume the other regressors are held constant and thus relate to another population
than the standard deviations based on the full sample. Bring proposes to use the variance
inflation factor (VIF) introduced above and jugde coefficients as less relevant when their
VIF is higher, i.e. when similar information is contained in other regressors. The result
described is obtained based on either the standard formula βˆi ∗ (si/sy) or using Brings’
proposal βˆi ∗ (sdi/
√
V IFi) ∗
√
n− 1/n− k.
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quences for estimation, t-tests, and inference. Multicollinearity cannot be suffi-
ciently identified based on the correlation matrix which shows only collinearity,
i.e. the common movement in two variables. I use the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) as one possible test for the multicorrelation in the independent variables.
The VIF of an independent variable is calculated as Vi = 1/(1 − R2(i)) where
R2(i) is obtained as the R2 regressing xi on a constant and the remaining re-
gressors.47 A high R2 in this auxiliary regression indicates common movement
with one or more of the variables and leads to a high Vi value.
In table 6 the regressions contain a dummy variable for English, French and
German legal origin while Scandinavian legal origin is omitted to prevent perfect
multicollinearity. For all regulatory variables the VIF is below 1.5; values above
5 or 10 are given as rules of thumb indicating a problem. The legal origin
dummies give clearly higher VIF up to about 6. As control variables they
are included to lessen the omitted variable bias of the parameters of interest.
Notably, multicollinearity in control variables does not affect the estimation of
the Basel pillars’ effect on bank stability.48 In sum, I reject multicollinearity to
harm the identification.
Non-normality In contrast, non-normality of the errors is found to be a
severe flaw in the re-estimated regressions. Figure 3 plots quantiles of the
OLS residuals against those of the normal distribution. Figure 3a is based on
regressions 1 and 3 in table 6, the baseline regressions for 1999 and 2011. Clear
deviations particularly in the central part of the distribution are apparent.
I suspect that the strong positive skewness of NPL is an important driver of the
model misspecification.49 I use a log transformation of the dependent variable
to reduce the skewness. As all NPL values are positive we can do so. The
log transformation attempts to linearize the relation between the independent
variables and NPL. A power transformation chosen more specific to the data
would yield a better fit but would come at the cost that both interpretation
becomes harder and predictive power can be harmed due to overfitting. Figure
3b shows the normal probability plot for residuals based on the dependent
log(NPL), other things equal. Now for 1999 the residuals fit much better to
normality. For 2011 the fit improves as well, but to a smaller extent; still a big
part in the middle of the distribution does not fit the normal distribution. The
47Mela & Kopalle, 2002, p. 676f
48Von Auer, 2007, p. 488f
49For the variables entering the regressions in Barth et al. the sample skewness attains values
of +1.5 and +2.3 for 1999 and 2011, respectively. The values slightly differ by the method
used. I employ
√
n− 1 ∗ m3/(m2)3/2 where mr = ∑n
i
(xi − x¯)r stands for the sample
moments of order r (e.g. Greene, 2008, p. 1020f).
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(a) Dependent variable is NPL for 1999 and 2011, respectively
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(b) Dependent variable is the log of NPL for 1999 and 2011, respectively
Figure 3: Normal probability plots for regressions related to Barth et al. (2012)
Plots are for regression 1 and 3 in table 6 (upper left, upper right) and for regression 1 and 3
in table 7 (lower left, lower right).
improved fit can be shown with a normality test on the regression residuals.
The Shapiro-Wilk tests’ Null hypothesis of normality is rejected for the errors
of all models in table 6 (p < .10), i.e. modeling NPL. Yet, modeling log(NPL)
yields p-values well above 10% confirming the visual better fit of the errors.50
The improved specification modeling log(NPL) is shown in table 7. The coef-
ficients in 2011 (models 3 and 4) are again not statistically different from zero
based on the overall F-test with p = .10 used as threshold. But for 1999 the
overall F-test statistic and the adjusted R2 increase considerably. Capital regu-
latory stringency increases bank stability with moderate significance in table 6.
Modeling log(NPL) capital stringency is identified as a highly significant driver
of NPL. Under the inclusion of government banks the result is still significant at
50Shapiro and Wilk (1965, p. 608) find their test to be quite sensitive to deviations, e.g. to
asymmetry. The Shapiro-Wilk test has drawbacks for large sample sizes (Shapiro & Wilk,
1965, p. 610) which is no problem here with below 100 observations.
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α = 5% (model 2 in table 7) while the analog in Barth et al. (2012), modeling
NPL, shows an insignificant first Basel pillar.
Table 7: OLS regressions of Barth et al. (2012) with log(NPL)
for 1999 for 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Regulation −0.201∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗ 0.050 0.048
(0.070) (0.076) (0.067) (0.063)
Private Monitoring −0.156 −0.029 0.015 0.022
(0.094) (0.128) (0.085) (0.079)
Official Supervisory Power 0.018 0.007 0.010 0.0004
(0.057) (0.069) (0.058) (0.062)
Entry Requirements 0.055 0.117 0.080 −0.087
Restrictions on Activities 0.223∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗ −0.060 −0.076
Government-Owned Banks 0.015∗∗ 0.003
Observations 62 56 76 69
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.407 -0.024 0.021
F Statistic 5.597∗∗∗ 5.196∗∗∗ 0.778 1.162
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable: Log of nonperforming loans to gross loans. Legal origin variables
are suppressed.
The results cast doubt on private monitoring as a key driver of bank stability.
Modeling log(NPL) the positive effect on bank stability is lost.51 Private mon-
itoring being an unmitigated good was a result of the book “Rethinking bank
regulation” by Barth et al. based on studies I and II in 1999 and 2002.52 In
Barth et al. (2012, p. 17ff) private monitoring turns insignificant in 1999 when
government banks are included. This questions the robustness of the positive
impact of the 3rd Basel pillar. Nevertheless, when I run the model in equa-
tion 1 for 2002 based on the dependent log(NPL)53 private monitoring becomes
significant at the 5% level and capital regulation turns insignificant – both in
contrast to the 1999 results. For survey III and 2006 no Basel pillar is signifi-
cant while the overall F-test rejects the hypothesis that all coefficients on the
regressors are zero. In 2011 I found no statistical evidence for any pattern in
the baseline model. In this sense from survey I in 1999 till survey IV in 2011
less and less of the variation in NPL can be explained.
I conclude that the patterns are not robust over time. This could either repre-
sent the true underlying pattern. Or it is (a) the result of outliers leading to a
biased picture which is discussed in the next subsection; (b) due to the contem-
poraneous nature of the left- and right-hand side variables which is discussed in
51The coefficient has a p-value of 0.103 for model 1 in table 7.
52Barth et al., 2006, p. 316
53To conserve space that regression is only shown below as model 1 in table 8b.
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subsection 3.4; (c) due to diverging country patterns not adequately modeled
by pooling. E.g. income and corruption might mediate the Basel pillar effect
on NPL which is discussed in subsection 3.5.
3.3 Outliers and strong influence
A concern about the regressions is that a small amount of countries with a
deviating trend blurs the view on the overall pattern. Then the results would
represent a mix of the deviating and the overall trend. We can identify outliers,
or unusual observations, using the prediction error, i.e. the residual ui = yi− yˆi
for country i. To make the deviation comparable I use the studentized regression
residuals to identify countries with a pattern outside the 95% confidence interval
of a normal distribution.54 Figure 4 shows the absolute values of the studentized
residuals exemplified for the 1999 baseline regression explaining log(NPL).55
Based on the approximation |z| > 2 the United States, Chile and Luxembourg
are outliers in the sense that they don’t fit the overall pattern.
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Figure 4: Outliers in OLS regression
Identification of countries with a deviating pattern based on studentized residuals exemplified
for model 1 in table 7. Country codes are United States (USA), Chile (CHL), Luxembourg
(LUX), Nigeria (NGA), Thailand (THA), Australia (AUS), and Argentinia (ARG).
54Studentized residuals are preferred over standardized residuals to identify outliers (Cook
& Weisberg, 1982, p. 37). Studentized residuals additionally consider different residual
variances which is relevant under heteroscedasticity.
55Model 1 in table 7.
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Removing outliers has a minor impact For the baseline model and each
survey year I separately drop the countries outside±2 and control for the impact
on the coefficients and significance. For 1999 the results of model 1 in table 7
do not qualitatively change; the adjusted R2 increases by 13 percentage points.
Similarly, for 2002, 2006, and 2011 the results on the effect of the Basel pillars
on NPL do not change when the outliers are dropped.56
Strong influence Residuals are not sufficient to identify influential observa-
tions. Imagine a perfect positive linear relationship between NPL as dependent
and supervisory power as regressor with many observations around the mean
of supervisory power. A country is added with a mean supervisory power value
but unusually high NPL. The regression line will not considerably shift because
there are many other observations around the mean of the explanatory variable.
The new observation produces a huge error |yi − yˆi| and is identified based on
absolute studentized residuals. Now a country is added with clearly the highest
level of supervisory power and an NPL level different from the linear trend. Due
to little information at this level of the independent variable the regression line
will adapt to the new observation. Therefore a small error results and the obser-
vation is not identified by studentized residuals while the estimated coefficient β
is considerably affected.57 Cook’s distance proposed by Cook (1977) evaluates
the change in βˆ from dropping an observation and is thus sensitive to influ-
ential observations. Dropping the countries which stand out based on Cook’s
distance does not qualitatively affect the results.58 Cook’s distance is hardly
helpful to identify clusters of countries as just single observations are dropped.
That said, dropping countries identified by absolute studentized residuals and
Cook’s distance speaks for the validity of the regression results in table 7.
3.4 Contemporaneous nature
I am concerned with measuring the effect of the Basel pillars implementation
on countries’ bank fragility. Observing a change in regulation, the subsequent
impact on bank fragility should be evaluated. In section 3.1 NPL in 1999 are
explained by the regulation in 1999. But regulation might only have an impact
on NPL after some time rendering the identification strategy inappropriate.59
56For 2002 entry into banking requirements turn significant at the 10% level. For 2006 the
significance of activity restrictions reduces from the 10% to the 5% level.
57Cook, 1977, p. 16f
58I drop Chile for 1999 and 2002 which is clearly the most influential country. For 2006 I drop
Luxembourg and Canada, for 2011 Iceland and Finland.
59Barth et al. write that “the contemporaneous nature of the right- and left-hand side variables
raises a caution in the interpretation” (Barth et al., 2012, p. 16).
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Measuring both explanatory and explained variables in the same year might in-
duce endogeneity because observing higher NPL can lead to calls for regulatory
intervention. Explaining NPL by last year’s regulation is a natural approach,
log(NPLit) = α+ regulation′i,t−1 β + control′i γ + ui (2)
i = 1, . . . , N, for 2000, 2003, 2007, ui ∼ N(0, σ2i )
where it is assumed that NPL exhibits no longer-term trends. Using more lags
of regulation reduces endogeneity but comes at the cost that the regulatory
impact might have faded out already. Based on the compromise to use one lag
– explaining with the 1999 regulation log(NPLi,2000), with the 2002 regulation
log(NPLi,2003) and with the 2006 regulation log(NPLi,2007) – no qualitative
difference in the Basel pillar coefficients is found. For 2012 no NPL data is
available such that the approach is not possible for survey IV. This robustness
is another hint that the estimated cross-section model is appropriate.
Still, endogeneity remains a concern. Countries with a high equilibrium NPL
level are more likely to enact tighter regulation. This country-specific effect is
not modeled in this section and would thus be captured by the error term which
then correlates with the regulatory variables. Section 4 sets out to approach this
issue incorporating the time dimension. Before that – and under the assumption
that endogeneity does not lead to flawed inference in the cross-section – the next
subsection approaches the policy question which countries gain, i.e. can reform
for the better, by tightening regulation related to the Basel pillars.
3.5 Modeling country differences
I gained evidence that a valid model to explain NPL in a cross-section approach
is obtained. This forms the basis to investigate the distinct impact of regulation
on bank stability which theory predicts for different institutional environments.
Therefore, I divide the country sample into groups and examine in which sample
the Basel pillars have a more profound impact.
The first aspect I control for is income. This is of interest as the Basel rules
are mainly produced by the rich countries and might thus be more adequate
for these. Income might be accepted as a proxy for development, the dimension
along which Boudriga et al. (2009, p. 301) divide their sample.60 As introduced
60Boudriga et al. do not make explicit how they decide which countries are developed and
which are developing. Based on that information the results would be more explicitly
comparable.
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in section 1 corruption will matter – e.g. for more supervisory power having a
positive or a negative effect on stability – and is the second aspect I control for.
To investigate the effect of income, a dummy variable is used that takes 1 if the
2012 GNI per capita is equal to or above $12,616 (“high income”) and 0 else.
This corresponds to the recent World Bank classification.61 Based on the ranks
of the Corruption Perception Index62 where the first rank stands for the least
corrupt country I build a corruption dummy that takes 1 if a country rank in a
certain year is worse than the mean rank and 0 else. Hence, corrupt countries
are assigned a 1.
Statistically, one might divide the countries into two groups and estimate the
coefficients separately, or one includes an interaction effect. In separate regres-
sions one assumes the variance of the errors to be different, with the interaction
term to be the same.63 The separate estimation has the downside to use less
information and thus leads to less significance.64 I use interaction effects where
a significant interaction can be directly seen from the statistic on the associ-
ated coefficient. I add the interactions of interest separately mainly to prevent
a strong decrease in degrees of freedom.65 The model for the income dummy
variable Inci and the interaction with capital regulation can be written as
log(NPLi) = α+ regulation′i β + control′i γ
+δCapitalRegulation ∗ Inci+ζ Inci+ui (3)
i = 1, . . . , N, for 1999, 2002, 2006, 2011, ui ∼ N(0, σ2i )
where the vector regulation for country i contains the capital regulatory vari-
able in the first position as well. The model can be rewritten as
log(NPLi) = (α+ ζ Inci) + (β1 + δ Inci) ∗ CapitalRegulationi
+regulation′−j,i β−j + control′i γ + ui
where the index −j represents the remaining regulatory variables collected in
regulation−j . From this formulation it is most easy to see that for the set of
countries with a per person income below the threshold (Inci = 0) we estimate
61The World Bank, 2014a.
62Transparency International (2013) in the time frame 1999-2011 is the original source while
the data summarized in one file was obtained from DICE Database (2014).
63Von Auer, 2007, p. 320
64Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003, p. 36
65In table 8 the models contain up to 9 variables plus an intercept having 62 observations. I
think this is not of great concern. As a comparison, having only 41 observations Barth et
al. (2006, p. 218) introduce the same amount of variables.
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the intercept α and the slope β1 on capital regulation while for the set of rich
countries (Inci = 1) we estimate the intercept α+ ζ and the slope β1 + δ.
Private monitoring is more helpful under low corruption It turns out
that in the estimation of equation 3 by OLS ζ and δ are both insignificant for
all Basel pillars. I.e. no significant interaction is identified. The same is true
when the income dummy is replaced by the corruption dummy. One exception
is the interaction with private monitoring in 1999. In that case δ is signif-
icantly positive which means that for the sampled high corruption countries
more private monitoring brings on average less stability than for low corrup-
tion countries. This pattern was blurred in the pooling over all countries in
model 1 of table 7 where for 1999 the negative coefficient on private monitoring
was not significant.66
As I found ζ of equation 3 to be insignificant one might drop it. Then one
assumes that only the regression slopes differ between the groups. One might
drop (only) δ as well, as it is insignificant, allowing just the intercepts to vary.
Both approaches might lead to an omitted variable bias where variability is
incorrectly assigned to the Basel pillars. Even so, models where only the in-
tercept or the slopes are allowed to vary are explicitly described67 such that
I consider it an empirical question whether a random slope (fixed intercept)
model is appropriate.
Firstly, I evaluate whether adding both the pure term and the interaction of
Inci with a Basel pillar significantly increases the models’ explanatory power.
To do so I use an F-test68 which considers in its test statistic the change in R2
from adding regressors (“incremental F-test”),
F = (R
2
2 −R21)/(k2 − k1)
(1−R22)/(N − k2 − 1)
where index i = 2 stands for the model with the greater and index i = 1 for
the model with the fewer number of predictors, R2i is the R2 of model i, ki
66The significant interaction does not mean that private monitoring has a statistical effect
for the subgroups. Estimating the equations for 1999 separately for Corruptioni = 0 and
Corruptioni = 1 private monitoring is neither significant for low nor for high corruption
countries.
67The approach can be described by a random coefficient regression model. Level 1 stands
for the lowest level of aggregation which is the country level here; level 2 or the group level
(Cohen et al., 2003, p. 545) is identified by the income or corruption dummy. If there is no
variation in intercepts or slopes across the groups the random coefficient regression model
is identical to (fixed) OLS regression (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 547).
68As far as the significance of changing one regressor is concerned a t-test would be sufficient.
Then I still use the F test to limit the concepts introduced.
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the number of predictors and N the number of observations in the model.69
Applying the test I assume to find the most appropriate model by maximizing
the share of total variation explained. In 1999, I find that adding both Inci and
Corruptioni interacted with capital regulatory stringency significantly increases
the model fit as the statistic F = (0.56−0.48)/(10−8)(1−0.47)/(62−10−1) = 5.88 lies above the critical
value F10−8;62−10−1;1−0.01 = 5.05 such that the Null of a population adjusted
R2 increment of zero is strongly rejected (p-value of 0.005). For 1999 and both
Inci and Corruptioni – each introduced as pure term and as interaction with the
Basel pillars – I find that all p-values for the incremental F-test lie below 0.012;
for 2002 below 0.024; for 2006 above 0.097. For 2011 the p-values are not of
interest as in all six variants the adjusted R2 remains negative. In other words,
introducing the interactions increases the model explanatory power considerably
for 1999 and 2002 but not in later years.
Appropriateness of including only the interaction Still, when both pure
and interaction term are included (equation 3) the coefficients are insignificant
with the single exception noted above. Thus, secondly I consider dropping Inci
and Corruptioni, respectively (ζ in equation 3) while leaving the interaction
of the dummy with one of the Basel pillars in the model. This procedure
is adequate as long as the model fit does not decrease significantly. Note,
however, the alternative to drop the interaction (δ in equation 3) and just use
Inci and Corruptioni which is the simpler model. I apply the decision rule to
(a) use the simpler model unless the increase from including the interaction is
at least 5% higher than the increase from including only Inci or Corruptioni;
(b) additionally, the resulting model is only printed in table 8 and 9 when the
interaction is significant and the incremental F-tests does not judge the full
model (equation 3) as better (p < .10).
For survey III in 2006 no interaction is significant and for survey IV in 2011
all adjusted R2 are negative. Table 9a gives the baseline model first. Model 2
shows an “interaction only surplus” of 18%. This is the increase in adjusted R2
from adding CapitalRegulation ∗ Inci over and above the increase from adding
just Inci. Following part (a) of the decision rule equation 3 is estimated with
Inci dropped. Model 3 in table 9a does not show the interaction with private
monitoring because the “interaction only surplus” of −2% is below 5% such
that the simpler model is preferred. Part (b) of the decision rule leads in no
case to the rejection of the model found in the first step. Therefore table 8 for
69Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003, p. 11f
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Table 8: OLS regressions with interactions based on income: 1999/2002
(a) For 1999 / survey I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Regulation −0.201∗∗∗ −0.093 −0.167∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗
Private Monitoring −0.156 −0.110 −0.113 −0.105
Official Supervisory Power 0.018 0.038 0.020 0.058
Entry Requirements 0.055 0.039 0.048 0.048
Restrictions on Activities 0.223∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
Capital Regulation * Inc −0.144∗∗∗
Inc −0.805∗∗∗
Supervisory Power * Inc −0.078∗∗∗
Observations 62 62 62 62
Interaction only surplus - 18% -2% 7%
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.482 0.466 0.473
F Statistic 5.597∗∗∗ 7.316∗∗∗ 6.915∗∗∗ 7.077∗∗∗
(b) For 2002 / survey II
(1) (2) (3)
Capital Regulation −0.047 −0.018 −0.017
Private Monitoring −0.197∗∗ −0.118 −0.123
Official Supervisory Power 0.039 0.023 0.057
Entry Requirements 0.117 0.096 0.100
Restrictions on Activities 0.108 0.040 0.040
Inc −0.849∗∗∗
Supervisory Power * Inc −0.076∗∗∗
Observations 77 77 77
Interaction only surplus - -13%, -13% 11%
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.291 0.302
F Statistic 3.251∗∗∗ 4.467∗∗∗ 4.648∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable is log(NPLi). Model 1 is supplied for comparison with table 7
and the analog for 2002. “Interaction only surplus” divides the percentage increase
in adjusted R2 going from the baseline model 1 to a model where Inci and the
relevant Basel pillar are interacted by the percentage increase from adding only
Inci. Inci = 1 for high income countries is based on the World Bank classification.
Legal origin variables and the constant are suppressed.
Inci and 9 for Corruptioni present no model where both the dummy and the
interaction with a Basel pillar is included.70
For both 1999 and 2002 the results show with a p < 0.05 that high income
countries face a lower bank fragility and corrupt countries face a higher bank
70Out of the models investigated the incremental F-test going from model 3 in table 9a to
the full model is rejected with a p-value of 0.12 which is by far the weakest rejection under
investigated models. Private monitoring interacted with Corruptioni was the only case
where for the full model dummy or interaction were significant.
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Table 9: OLS regressions with interactions based on corruption: 1999/2002
(a) For 1999 / survey I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Regulation −0.201∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.173∗∗
Private Monitoring −0.156 −0.175 −0.208∗∗ −0.170
Official Supervisory Power 0.018 0.043 0.047 0.029
Entry Requirements 0.055 0.051 0.052 0.049
Restrictions on Activities 0.223∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
Corruption 0.760∗∗
Private Monitoring * Corruption 0.103∗∗∗
Supervisory Power * Corruption 0.074∗∗∗
Observations 62 51 51 51
Interaction only surplus - 0% 9% 5%
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.540 0.556 0.549
F Statistic 5.597∗∗∗ 7.522∗∗∗ 7.943∗∗∗ 7.752∗∗∗
(b) For 2002 / survey II
(1) (2) (3)
Capital Regulation −0.047 −0.060 −0.061
Private Monitoring −0.197∗∗ −0.237∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗
Official Supervisory Power 0.039 0.022 0.018
Entry Requirements 0.117 0.078 0.074
Restrictions on Activities 0.108 0.101 0.097
Corruption 0.766∗∗
Private Monitoring * Corruption 0.097∗∗∗
Observations 77 61 61
Interaction only surplus - -4%, 0% 9%
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.268 0.275
F Statistic 3.251∗∗∗ 3.435∗∗∗ 3.525∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Compare notes in table 8. “Interaction only surplus” is calculated analog using
Corruptioni. Corruptioni = 1 stands for corrupt countries.
fragility.71 In 1999, more stringent capital regulation is stabilizing in high
income countries while it has no effect in low income countries.72 Both in 1999
and 2002 supervisory power is significantly more helpful in rich countries. The
results for 1999 in table 9a show that capital stringency has a stabilizing effect
regardless of the corruption level; this appears reasonable. In corrupt societies
supervisory power is harmful from a theoretical perspective which is found in
the data for 1999 but not in later years.73 The interaction for corrupt countries
71Model 2 in table 8a/8b and model 2 in 9a/9b.
72Compare model 2 in 8a.
73Compare model 4 in 9a. Note that the effect of official supervision is nonnegative for low
corruption countries as well.
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and private monitoring has a positive coefficient, i.e. in corrupt countries private
monitoring is to a smaller extent associated with higher stability. The significant
coefficient on private monitoring of −.21 in 1999 (model 3 in 9a) shows that
private monitoring decreases fragility in low corruption countries. The net
effect for high corruption countries is numerically −.21 + .10 = −.11. A Wald
test for the joint hypothesis that the coefficient on private monitoring and the
coefficient on the interaction with private monitoring are both zero is rejected
with p < 0.01. Thus, more private monitoring increases stability in corrupt
countries as well, however to a smaller extent.74 For 2002 the same result is
obtained.
In conclusion, based on the cross-section (a) for the period around the financial
crisis starting in 2007 we cannot identify a clear impact of regulation on bank
stability (surveys III and IV in 2006 and 2011), (b) in 1999 and 2002 bank
stability is higher in rich countries and lower in corrupt countries, (c) in 1999
and partly in 2002 capital regulation and supervisory power are more effective
in rich countries to increase stability, (f) in 1999 and partly in 2002 private
monitoring and supervisory power are less helpful in corrupt countries, (d) in
1999 and 2002 private monitoring significantly increases stability in corrupt
countries, and (e) in 1999 supervisory power significantly decreases stability in
corrupt countries.
4 Modeling the time dimension
A small amount of observations could be the reason that we hardly see a pat-
tern of regulation on bank fragility in the cross-section for 2006 and 2011. This
section introduces the time dimension to use as many observations as possi-
ble investigating the Basel pillars’ effect on bank fragility. NPL are shown to
exhibit a persistent pattern which reduces the confidence in the simple OLS
cross-section results.75 Statistically one can account for the dynamic panel
structure by modeling the error term using an autoregressive process. Repro-
ducing Boudriga et al. (2009) in subsection 4.1 follows this idea using panel
corrected standard errors. Evidence is gained that serial correlation remains in
the error terms casting doubt on the results in Boudriga et al. (2009). This is
the motivation to explicitly model the dynamic process with lagged NPL as an
74When I estimate the model separately for Corruptioni = 0 and Corruptioni = 1, private
monitoring is not significant. As noted above, separate estimation uses less information and
thus leads to less significance.
75Bond, 2002, p. 141f
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additional regressor in subsection 4.2. This section is based on a more compre-
hensive set of control variables which on the one hand limits the comparability
with the cross-section analysis. On the other hand, we gain insights about the
robustness of my findings from the different approach to model NPL.76
4.1 Estimation using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE)
Boudriga et al. (2009) model NPL in a panel for the years 2002-06. Their
approach is more involved than the work of Barth et al. because (a) they in-
corporate the time dimension, (b) they include a more realistic set of control
variables, and (c) they try to avoid potential endogeneity by lagging time vari-
ant control variables. Up to now I assumed that NPL are only affected by the
regulatory variables and the countries’ legal origin. However, it seems to be
obvious that the share of NPL is influenced by the current state of the econ-
omy. Nations’ GDP growth is one of the control variables used in Boudriga et
al. (2009). Their model can be written as
NPLit = α+ regulation′it β + controli γ + control′i,t−1 δ + uit (4)
i = 1, . . . , N, t ∈ (2002− 2006), uit∼N(0, σ2i )
where the regulatory variables vary over time and are thus written with a time
index t. Based on the time frame 2002-06 surveys II and III of Barth et al.
(2013b) are relevant. The NPL are available on a yearly frequency while survey
II and III for 2002 and 2005/06, respectively. The question is how to merge the
data. Boudriga et al. (2009, p. 294) attach the survey II values to the years
2002-04 and those for survey III to 2005-06. It is assumed that the variation
in the regulatory setting between the surveys is minor. Definitions for the vari-
ables used in Boudriga et al. (2009) are shown in table 10. Variables already
introduced in section 3.1 are omitted in the table. As control variables the
authors use a time-invariant dummy capturing the countries’ financial develop-
ment (effect on NPL measured by coefficient γ) and four time-variant variables
(effect on NPL measured by coefficients δ). The time-variant variables are cap-
ital to risk-weighted assets, bank provisions to NPL, return on assets (ROA)
and the nominal GDP growth. The level of NPL might induce changes in these
time-variant control variables. E.g. as a reaction to observing a higher share of
NPL provisions to NPL might be increased. That would render right-hand side
76Wooldridge (2000, p. 625f) makes the point that a relationship should be significant in
different models to be judged as robust.
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variables dependent. To circumvent this endogeneity problem the time-variant
control variables are lagged by one period.77
Boudriga et al. is not reproducible The time-invariant control variable is
based on a financial development index and gives a 1 for developed countries and
a 0 else. The variable is highly significant across the Boudriga et al. regressions
in which they state that they have data for 59 countries78,79 Notably, the source
given, World Economic Forum (2008), contains a ranking only for 52 countries.
The authors do not note that they improved the data, e.g. that they determined
the ranking for more countries. I can neither explain nor cure this discrepancy
making it impossible to reproduce the results in Boudriga et al. (2009).80
A second discrepancy in the data is minor compared to the missingness de-
scribed. Boudriga et al. use a variable where required minimum capital is de-
ducted from “Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%)”. The source
cited in Boudriga et al. (2009, p. 295) contains only “Bank Regulatory Capital
to Risk-Weighted Assets”81 and I was not able to find a source for the required
minimal capital for the comprehensive country set and time frame used.82
Although the reproduction of Boudriga et al. (2009) is not possible, estimat-
ing a similar model allows insights about the robustness of the patterns found.
Equation 4 pools the coefficients over countries and years. Boudriga et al. use
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) in their estimation. In the regressions
so far we controlled for heteroscedasticity relying on White (1980)’s standard
errors. These are not appropriate in the panel setting83 where the errors pos-
sibly exhibit panel structure. With panel structure Beck and Katz refer to (a)
errors of different countries which are linked for the same point in time – con-
temporaneous correlation – e.g. when adjacent countries suffer under the same
shock, (b) error variances which differ by country – cross-section heteroscedas-
77The implicit assumption is that changes in NPL are not informative two periods ahead.
Lagging two periods or more, however, might prevent a recent trend to be recognized as
driving the NPL around the same time. Using one lag appears to be a good compromise.
78Data on 59 countries for 2002-06 are 5 ∗ 59 = 295 observations.
79E.g. Boudriga et al., 2009, p. 299
80The countries for which the ranking is provided are different from those for which complete
cases are available in Barth et al. (2013b). Using the World Economic Forum ranking
variable in my re-estimation reduces the observations to 39, a major deviation from 59 in
the original. In 2008, the ranking was produced for the first time. The data from the
following survey is barely more comprehensive (55 instead of 52 countries are ranked; World
Economic Forum, 2009).
81IMF, 2007, p. 168f
82However, I see the level of required minimum capital as rather alike at least over regions
such that the difference might have no major impact.
83Beck & Katz, 1995, note 13
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Table 10: Variable definitions and data sources for Boudriga et al. (2009)
Variable Definition Source
Bank regulatory
capital to
risk-weighted assets
(%)
The capital adequacy of deposit takers. It is a
ratio of total regulatory capital to its assets held,
weighted according to risk of those assets. Note
that due to differences in national accounting,
taxation, and supervisory regimes, these data
are not strictly comparable across countries.
IMF (2007)
received by
The World
Bank
(2013a)
Bank Provisions to
nonperforming
loans (%)
Loan loss provisions as a share of nonperform-
ing loans. Nonperforming loans are loans for
which the contractual payments are delinquent,
usually defined as (...) being overdue for more
than a certain number of days. Note that due to
differences in national accounting, taxation, and
supervisory regimes, these data are not strictly
comparable across countries.
IMF (2007)
received by
The World
Bank
(2013a)
Bank Return on
Assets
Data definitions follow, to the extent possible,
the methodology of the Financial Soundness In-
dicators Compilation Guide. “This FSI is in-
tended to measure deposit takers’ efficiency in
using their assets. It is calculated by dividing
net income before extraordinary items and taxes
by the average value of total assets (financial
and nonfinancial) over the same period.” (IMF,
2006, p. 184)
IMF (2008),
IMF (2011),
IMF (2013)
Foreign-Owned
Banks
The extent to which the banking system’s assets
are foreign owned.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
Bank Concentration
(Asset)
The degree of concentration of assets in the 5
largest banks.
Barth et al.
(2013b)
GDP growth
(annual %)
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at mar-
ket prices based on constant local currency. Ag-
gregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all res-
ident producers in the economy plus any prod-
uct taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation of
fabricated assets or for depletion and degrada-
tion of natural resources.
The World
Bank
(2014b)
FDI rank dummy Dummy variable taking 1 for countries with a
financial development index numerically higher
to the median rank and 0 otherwise. The highest
developed country is ranked first such that the
value 1 identifies relatively developed countries.
World
Economic
Forum
(2008)
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ticity84 – e.g. when developing countries have more unexplained movement in
NPL, and (c) error variances which differ for a country over time – panel-level
heteroscedastic errors – e.g. due to unexplained changes in countries’ debtors
behavior. PCSE correct the standard errors for the panel structure and allow
for correct inference. The key assumption needed for PCSE is the absence of
autocorrelation in the individual error processes, i.e. no serial correlation.85
Serial correlation in PCSE The Wooldridge test for serial correlation based
on first differences is used to check the absence of serial correlation.86 Residuals
are taken from an OLS regression based on equation 4 where all left- and right-
hand variables are in first differences, no constant is specified and the covariance
matrix is estimated robustly. The residuals are then regressed on their first lag
estimated in the same robust way (residit = ρ ∗ residi,t−1 + errorit). Based on
a Wald test for the simple linear hypothesis H0 : ρ = −.5 a p-value < 0.01 is
obtained which is strong evidence for serial correlation in the data.87,88
A strategy to get rid of the serial dependence is to include the lagged dependent
variable as a regressor. This leads to endogeneity and motivates the application
of linear dynamic panel estimators in subsection 4.2. Another option is to model
the error terms with an AR1 autocorrelation structure. The Stata command
xtpcse offers such an option.89 Whether the errors are in fact free of serial
correlation is not tested by Boudriga et al. To use the serial correlation test
based on first differences we would need to incorporate the AR(1) error structure
into the auxiliary regression. I prefer a test which rests upon the regression
residuals uˆit of the original regression. As PCSE is a pooled OLS approach with
corrected standard errors I use the Wooldridge test for serial correlation after
pooled OLS presented in Wooldridge (2010, p. 198f). An OLS regression of the
form NPLit = ρ∗ uˆi,t−1+regressors+errorit is used where the lagged residual
and the same regressors as in the original equation are included. Based on
84Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 636 call this “panel heteroscedasticity” which can be confused with
panel-level heteroscedastic errors.
85Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 638 and note 13
86Wooldridge, 2010, p. 319f
87Intuitively ρ = −.5 under the Null because ∆uit and ∆ui,t−1 – where ∆ is the first difference
operator – share half of their elemens, the first containing −ui,t−1 and the second +ui,t−1.
88The Stata command xtserial (Drukker, 2003) can be reproduced using in both auxiliary OLS
regressions the option cluster() which allows for heteroscedastic error terms of a country and
is robust against serial correlation. These options allow for correct inference under structure
in the errors when they deviate from the ideal assumptions. However, the errors are not
transformed as then ρ would be a performance measure of the transformation.
89Controlling both for contemporaneous correlation across panels and heteroscedastic errors
within panels – i.e. for a country over time – is not possible due to insufficient data. Thus, it
is only controlled for the latter error term structure. Boudriga et al. (2009) do not explicitly
state that they correct for serial correlation but possibly they set the option correlation(ar1)
of the Stata command xtpcse as well.
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robust standard errors the hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 stands for no serial correlation
and is rejected with a p-value of p < 0.01.
As I find a strong violation of the absence of serial correlation assumption when
estimating the model in equation 4 by PCSE I consider it as inappropriate to
interpret these results based on standard errors while the coefficients themselves
should be consistent. Having said that, I provide the re-estimation of Boudriga
et al. (2009, p. 299) in the appendix in table 13.90
4.2 Estimation using a dynamic panel
Serial dependence is a core challenge in explaining bank fragility in terms of
NPL. The strategy to adjust the error structure using PCSE does not appear
to be successful, at least for the data I use. An alternative to cope with serial
dependence is to include the lagged NPL as a regressor. This allows to model a
dynamic process where current realizations are influenced by past ones. I allow
for individual specific effects µi to capture countries’ heterogeneity. Writing the
model
log(NPLit) = α ∗ log(NPLi,t−1) + regulation′i β
+control′i γ + control′i,t−1 δ + µi + vit (5)
i = 1, . . . , N, for t ∈ (2002− 2006), t ∈ (2007− 2011),
E[µi] = E[vit] = E[µivit] = 0, endogenous are NPL
for the period t − 1, i.e. log(NPLi,t−1) = ... + µi + vi,t−1, shows that the
lagged dependent and the country specific effects µi are correlated and thus
an endogeneity bias is present.91 Using first differences to eliminate the time-
invariant µi is a natural approach. However, log(NPLit) − log(NPLi,t−1) =
α ∗ (log(NPLi,t−1)− log(NPLi,t−2)) + δ ∗ ...+ vit − vi,t−1 contains on the right-
90Most of the significant variables are numerically near and the levels of significance basi-
cally match. Capital to risk-weighted assets is the variable which differs conceptually and is
insignificant while relevant at the 10%-level in the original. In my regression ROA is signif-
icant while it is not in the original. Dropping the problematic FDI rank variable increases
observations to 192-200 and takes all significance from foreign-owned banks. The rest of the
results are only marginally influenced; supervisory power in model 3 turns significant at the
1% level.
91For a large time dimension T the endogeneity can be irrelevant. The data here is of small
T , large N . If a countries’ financial crisis is not modeled and thus captured by the error
term all else equal the higher NPLit will be captured by a greater fixed effect. For t + 1
both the fixed effect and the regressor NPLi,t−1 are larger and thus endogeneity is present.
The effect is relevant when the shock affects µi strongly which is the case for the small T
here (Roodman, 2009, p. 101).
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hand side the negative vi,t−1 and a positive vi,t−1 in the lagged term.92 Due to
the negative correlation in the error term both OLS on first differences and a
fixed effects estimator lead to an underestimation of α and to misleading results.
Using pooled OLS on the undifferenced equation 5 leads to an overestimation
of α because the positive µi is contained in log(NPLi,t) and in log(NPLi,t−1).
Bond (2002, p. 144) proposes to use these bounds as a check on results of GMM
estimators I introduce below.
I follow the variable selection in Boudriga et al. (2009) where I replace the
financial development dummy – which is not available in an adequate scope – by
the income dummy introduced in section 3.5.93 I continue to model log(NPLit)
as dependent because it produced more normal errors (compare figure 3). I
put in the three Basel pillars at once because the pillars might interact and
the panel setting allows the identification of the higher amount of coefficients.94
For 2002-06 I obtain 0.52 and 0.98 as bounds for αˆ.
To handle the endogeneity in equation 5 I use instrumental variables (IVs)
implemented by the generalized method of moments (GMM). GMM models of
the 1980s relied on the assumption that regressors are strictly exogenous, or
alternatively, strictly exogenous IVs are available. Arellano and Bond (1991)
propose a GMM estimator with the more restrictive assumption of absence
of serial correlation in the error terms which allows to cope with regressors
and IVs that are not strictly exogenous. In their difference GMM estimator
unobservable individual specific effects µi are differenced out. Then lags of the
time-variant regressors are used as instruments to handle endogeneity. When
there is no serial correlation in the errors of the differenced equation 5 the
endogenous regressor log(NPLi,t−1)− log(NPLi,t−2) can be instrumented with
its second and deeper lags.95,96
Weights used to calculate the variance of the GMM estimators can be based on
a matrix that does not depend on estimated parameters (one-step GMM) or on
an initial consistent estimate which enters the weight matrix (two-step GMM).
92The differenced lagged term is the equation written for the period t−1, i.e. log(NPLi,t−1)−
log(NPLi,t−2) = α ∗ (log(NPLi,t−2)− log(NPLi,t−3)) + δ ∗ ...+ vi,t−1 − vi,t−2.
93The FDI rank dummy in Boudriga et al., 2009 (compare table 10) is highly significant over
the authors’ regressions but is only available for a little amount of countries. The high
income dummy based on the World Bank classification is clearly different conceptually but
to a less extent concerning the effective country grouping and captures an important country
characteristic as well.
94A possible influence of the Basel pillars on each other is assumed to be irrelevant over all
the regressions in Boudriga et al. (2009).
95Arellano & Bond, 1991, p. 277f
96The importance to check the assumption that ρ = 0 in vˆit = ρˆvˆi,t−2 + errorit is expressed
by the title of the paper introducing difference GMM, namely “Some tests of specification
for panel data”.
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The uncertainty from the initial estimate translates into a bias of the efficient
two-step GMM in small samples which can be accounted for by the Windmeijer
(2005) correction.97 However, the two-step GMM is only better under certain
assumptions for which it is unclear how to check them in practice.98 The
bias of the efficient two-step GMM is affected by the general concern of weak
instruments as well as by the use of too many instruments.99 The number
of instruments has to be adjusted to the sample size100 while it is unclear
what amount of instruments is too high.101 I limit the lags used as IVs for
the endogenous variable as much as possible given the rather small amount of
observations.
Model 1 in table 11 gives the difference GMM estimator for equation 5 where
the lags used as instruments for the endogenous variable NPLit are limited to
two.102 The choices in terms of one- and two-step and the use of t instead of z
statistics due to the small sample do not qualitatively affect the results.103 The
estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent (αˆ) is outside the credible range
and extraordinarily high.
Blundell and Bond (1998, p. 120ff) show that under small T and a “moderately
large”104 autoregressive parameter α difference GMM exhibits low precision and
a considerable bias in small samples. In other words, the approach to instrument
first differences of regressors with the levels of the lagged regressors is not helpful
here.105 The idea of system GMM is to introduce a second equation where the
regressors are in levels and sufficiently lagged first differences of the regressors
97Windmeijer, 2005, p. 27ff
98A symmetric finite sample distribution of the GMM estimator (Windmeijer, 2005, p. 31)
and moment conditions which are linear in the parameters (Windmeijer, 2005, p. 29) are
assumed.
99Windmeijer, 2005, p. 31
100Arellano & Bover, 1995, p. 41
101Roodman, 2009, p. 99
102I follow the advice in Roodman (2009, p. 129f) about GMM specification choices to report.
All variables not noted to be endogenous – in equation 5 only NPL – are assumed to
be exogenous, or “IV-style instruments”. In all GMM estimations as additional IV-style
instruments control of corruption – “perceptions of the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain” – and government effectiveness – “perceptions of (...) the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures” – are added
(The World Bank, 2014c).
103I always use the robust option of the xtabond2 command in Stata which yields standard
errors which are consistent against any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
within the countries in the one-step procedure. The two-step procedure is robust by con-
struction while the robust option triggers the Windmeijer correction.
104Blundell & Bond, 1998, p. 115
105Blundell and Bond (1998, p. 134) present evidence for the clear superiority of system GMM
in the case of α = .8, N = 200, and T = 11. In model 1 of table 11 all three parameters
are worse indicating the use of system GMM.
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Table 11: Dynamic panel estimation for 2002-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of NPL (L) 1.16∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
Capital Regulation 0.03 0.00 0.00 −0.01
Private Monitoring −0.15∗∗ −0.03 −0.04∗ −0.05∗
Supervisory Power 0.07∗ 0.02 0.01 0.01
Capital to RWA (L) 0.01 −0.01 −0.00 −0.01
Prov. to NPL (L) 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROA (L) −0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.03
Government-Own. −0.88 −0.21∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.22
Foreign-Own. Banks −0.76∗ −0.02 −0.05 −0.01
Asset concentr. 0.05 −0.11 −0.18 −0.28
GDP growth (L) 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00
Inc −0.24 −0.22 −0.26
Observations 122 190 190 190
Countries 58 68 68 68
GMM method difference system system system
Steps two-step one-step two-step two-step
Instruments 18 23 23 33
Arellano-Bond test 0.53 0.88 0.86 0.56
Sargan test (p-value) 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.81
Hansen test (p-value) 0.35 0.45 0.45 0.54
Assumed endogenous NPL NPL NPL NPL, ROA
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Dependent variable is log(NPLit). The constant is suppressed. The Arellano-Bond
test has the H0 of no autoregressive process of 2nd order in first differences. The
Sargan and the Hansen test have the Null of strictly exogenous instruments.
are used as instruments.106 The identification of the level equation relies on
the availability of variables that have a constant correlation with the country
specific effects µi.107 Given this additional assumption of system GMM the
estimator is shown to considerably increase precision and reduce finite sample
bias.108
Model 2 in table 11 gives the one-step system GMM estimator for equation
5. The coefficient of the lagged dependent is now in the credible range, 23
instruments on 68 countries appear reasonable, the Arellano and Bond (1991)
serial correlation test on the first difference equation does not reject the Null
of absence of an autoregressive process of order 2 (p-value of 0.88), and the
instruments appear to be sufficiently exogenous.109 Model 3 is based on the
two-step procedure for which the assumptions are a concern (see above). The
106Arellano & Bover, 1995, p. 45
107Arellano & Bover, 1995, p. 44
108Blundell & Bond, 1998, p. 133f
109The p-value of the Sargan test with the Null of exogenous instruments is 0.45.
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specification tests are passed similar well as in model 2 while there is more
significance. For the cross-section and 2002 I found evidence that both private
monitoring and higher income are associated with higher stability (table 8b
and 9b). Under a different set of control variables for 2002-06 we again find
private monitoring to increase bank stability (p-value of 0.08). Controlling for
the income110 – which appeared crucial in the cross-section – model 3 gives us
the idea that a higher share of government-owned banks reduces bank fragility.
Model 4 in table 11 shows the impact of introducing year dummies and assum-
ing ROAi,t−1 to be endogenous additionally to NPL. Year dummies model a
potential pattern over time.111 I suspect that a higher share of NPL carries
information about the lagged ROA and the lagged provisions to NPL. Both
variables are lagged in Boudriga et al. (2009) to prevent endogeneity. Their
underlying idea is that NPL today influences both variables; e.g. the ROA de-
crease when more loans are in default. The dependent variable then affects the
right-hand side. My point is that one lag might not be sufficient to prevent
endogeneity under the observed autocorrelation in NPLit. Rather, log(NPLit)
correlates with log(NPLi,t−1) and thus NPL today carry information about
ROAi,t−1. The validity of the instruments in model 4 increases from modeling
ROA as endogenous. Private monitoring is found to robustly decrease fragility
before the financial crisis while the share of government banks is not a robust
driver of NPL.112
For the financial crisis period 2007-2011 table 12 gives the results.113 As the
credible range for αˆ I obtain 0.60-0.91.114 Model 1 is analog to the one in
table 11 shown for the one-step procedure and qualitatively unchanged using
two-step. The autoregressive coefficient αˆ is outside the credible range, here it
is too small. The serial correlation test for AR(2) gives a p = 0.15 which is no
strong evidence for the absence of serial correlation in the errors. Hence, time
110Note that difference GMM is not able to identify time-invariant regressors.
111In equation 5 we introduce a term λt representing time fixed effects. Dummies for T − 1
periods are included. Applying the difference GMM estimator, Arellano & Bond, 1991,
p. 288 include time fixed effects as well.
112The residuals of model 3 and 4 in table 11 appear rather randomly distributed. Higher
NPL might induce an increase in supervisory power as well. Modeling supervisory power as
endogenous drives up the instrument count to 37 and the coefficient on private monitoring
turns insignificant. The stabilizing effect of private monitoring is thus not strictly robust
but depends on the assumptions one is willing to make.
113I have to decide how to attach survey III and IV to the years 2007-11. For 2002-06 I followed
Boudriga et al. (2009, p. 294). I attach survey III representing 2005-06 to 2005-08 while
survey IV representing 2011-12 to 2009-11 assuming that regulation is partly anticipated.
114The credible range for 2007-11 is calculated including year dummies. For 2002-06 I ex-
cluded year dummies in the auxiliary regressions as they were not needed to prevent serial
correlation. Excluding year dummies in 2007-11 yields a marginally different credible range
of 0.58-0.89.
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fixed effects are introduced. This yields αˆ = 0.85 and 0.95 for the one-step and
two-step procedure, respectively. The autoregressive parameter is high. This
motivates the use of system GMM in model 2 where the regression results are
invalid because both the Sargan and the Hansen (1982, p. 1049f) test reject
the validity of the instruments. The Sargan test becomes inconsistent when
the errors deviate from the ideal. The Hansen test is more consistent under
deviations in the one-step estimation but is weakened by a high number of
instruments.115
Table 12: Dynamic panel estimation for 2007-2011
(1) (2) (3)
Log of NPL (L) 0.19 0.92∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
Capital Regulation 0.06 0.02 0.02
Supervisory Power 0.00 0.00 0.01
Private Monitoring 0.05 0.04∗∗ 0.03
Capital to RWA (L) 0.00 −0.00 0.00
Prov. to NPL (L) −0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00
ROA (L) −0.02 −0.02 −0.13∗∗∗
Government-Own. 2.16 −0.19 −0.24
Foreign-Own. Banks 0.20 0.08 0.07
Asset concentr. −0.40 0.08 0.09
GDP growth (L) 0.01 0.00 0.01∗
Inc −0.01 −0.04
Observations 251 283 283
Countries 76 77 77
GMM method difference system system
Steps one-step one-step one-step
Instruments 22 32 46
Arellano-Bond test 0.15 0.37 0.38
Sargan test (p-value) 0.004 0.000 0.000
Hansen test (p-value) 0.006 0.002 0.066
Assumed endogenous NPL NPL NPL, ROA
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Dependent variable is log(NPLit). Year dummies and constant are suppressed.
Model 1 and 2 are invalid as their Sargan and Hansen tests reject the instruments’
validity.
One might check the effect of all kinds of additional instruments on validity. I
restrict myself to test for the already included ROA and the provisions to NPL
whether they are actually exogenous. Model 3 in table 12 is the same as model 2
where the ROAi,t−1 are now assumed to be endogenous. One might trust these
results because the autoregressive coefficient is (just) in the credible range,
serial correlation does not seem to be an issue (p = .38) and the p-value p = .07
of the Hansen test does not reject the Null of valid instruments at a 5% level
115Hansen, 1982, p. 1049 and Roodman, 2009, p. 97f
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of uncertainty. Critical is model 3 because the additional endogenous regressor
drives up the instrument count to 46 having observations for 77 countries which
is an instrument share that raises a concern about the validity of the Hansen
test. Following the Sargan test the validity of the instruments is rejected and
the results should not be trusted.
Being aware of the limitations of model 3 in table 12 the crisis period is char-
acterized by bank fragility not influenced by any of the Basel pillars. Instead,
another pattern emerges where higher ROA reduce bank fragility on average
over all countries. A higher GDP growth should reduce the NPL as well as
it becomes easier to pay credit rates under higher income and nominally fixed
rates. However, GDP growth is with a numerically rather small coefficient
linked to higher fragility. This could represent NPL soaring with the financial
crisis especially in the countries where a credit boom increased the GDP more,
i.e. a positively linked effect. The explanation assumes that NPL affects the
lagged GDP growth in the regression which is a sign that the first lag of GDP
is not enough to prevent endogeneity. As we are clearly limited in the number
of observation it does not appear reasonable to model GDP growth as another
endogenous variable. Rather, I have to assume that the potential endogeneity
of the variable does not affect the coefficients of interest strongly.
When I replace the dummy Inci in tables 11 and 12 by Corruptioni the coeffi-
cient on the dummy term remains insignificant. An interpretation is that the
control variables added in equation 5 capture the important aspects of rich and
corrupt countries such that the subsamples generated by Corruptioni and Inci
no more differ in their level. Introducing the pure dummies and the dummies
interacted with the Basel pillars yields no significant results for 2002-06. In the
cross-section I was not able to obtain results for 2006 as well.116 Based on the
2007-11 model in table 12 I do not investigate the effect of interactions as the
model is at the threshold of being invalid.
In conclusion, based on the GMM estimation the years before the financial cri-
sis appear as coined by the stabilizing effects of private monitoring. With the
financial crisis starting in 2007 the Basel pillars can no more explain stability
which is consistent with the cross-section results. Given doubt about the va-
lidity of the GMM approach in 2007-11 NPL are driven by ROA. Interactions
were not found to be significant for 2002-06.
116For 2002 we were only able to identify differences in the Basel pillars impact on NPL when
we applied the decision rule to use the interaction without the level dummy in some cases.
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5 Conclusion
I empirically investigate how countries should implement the Basel accords to
reform for the better. I focus on the effect of the Basel pillars on the stability of
the banking sector. The World Bank data underlying the analysis requires ag-
gregation. The indexation in Barth et al. (2013b) is shown to have considerable
weaknesses and I clarify assumptions needed for an investigation based on the
data. The extent to which bank fragility can be explained by the Basel pillars
deteriorates over the time frame 1999-2011. Tackling endogeneity and the per-
sistent pattern of nonperforming loans (NPL) using dynamic panel estimators
shows that for 2002-06 private monitoring is associated with higher bank sta-
bility over the hole country set. Investigating country differences demonstrates
that richer and less corrupt countries enjoy more stable banking systems. For
1999 and partly for 2002 I show that in corrupt countries stability is on average
decreased when supervisory power goes up, and rises less than for incorrupt
countries in increased private monitoring. For the financial crisis period 2007-
11 the dynamic panel approach indicates that stability is higher with more
productive banks while the Basel pillars do not have an impact.
Policy makers should take away from the study that for countries suffering
from high corruption and low income (1) increasing supervisory power has a
potentially destabilizing effect and (2) more private monitoring and capital
regulation is less helpful than for the typical country engaged in developing the
Basel accords.
These recommendations are cautiously phrased considering the limitations of
the analysis. A multiplicity of distinct measures is subsumed under the headline
of each Basel pillar. Even so supervisory power has downsides, concrete mea-
sures under supervisory review can be helpful in poor and corrupt countries.
A direction for further research is a tailored compilation of indices using the
unaggregated answers in the World Bank surveys. Thus packages of measures
with stabilizing effects for developed and for corrupt countries can be identified
better. The variable NPL limits the number of countries available in my anal-
ysis. The missingness in NPL could be non-random as the countries which are
able to provide the data might have a more sophisticated banking system. This
motivates the use of sample selection models where in a first step the probabil-
ity of countries to participate is determined; or to choose a different proxy for
bank fragility over which Gadanecz and Jayaram (2008) give an overview. In
survey IV representing 2011/12 new questions were included as a reaction to
the financial crisis. For comparability over time these questions are excluded
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in my analysis but are important for further research. Not only is “the system-
atic collection of data on bank regulatory and supervisory policies only in its
nascent stages”117. Accordingly limited is the research on how to reform bank
regulation for the better.
117Barth et al., 2013a, p. 1f
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Appendix
Table 13: PCSE approach re-estimating Boudriga et al. (2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital to RWA (L) −0.01 −0.01 −0.05 0.00
Prov. to NPL (L) −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
ROA (L) −1.13∗∗ −1.13∗∗ −1.38∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗
Government-Own. 1.88 1.89 1.47 1.61
Foreign-Own. Banks −6.52∗∗ −6.53∗∗ −6.97∗∗ −6.92∗∗
Asset concentr. −5.26∗∗ −5.25∗∗ −4.60∗∗ −4.80∗
GDP growth (L) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07
FDI rank −6.44∗∗∗ −6.44∗∗∗ −6.33∗∗∗ −6.87∗∗∗
Capital Regulation 0.02
Supervisory power 0.43∗∗
Private Monitoring 0.45
Observations 115 115 115 111
Adj. R2 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.49
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable is NPL which are modeled for 2002-06. PCSE are used
(Beck & Katz, 1995) where the errors are modeled by an AR(1)-process. The
validity of the approach is contested because the absence of serial correlation
is rejected (compare section 4.1, page 34). The constant is suppressed.
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